



States with a higher concentration of income going to the top
one percent are more likely to adopt income tax
Americans are taxed at a federal – and often state – level. But what affects whether or not states
adopt taxes? In new research, Thomas Hayes and Christopher Dennis have determined that
the concentration of wealth matters for state tax systems. They find that there is a positive
relationship between income going to the top 1 percent and the likelihood a state will adopt an
income tax, suggesting that state authorities are keen to capture the income of top earners when
income becomes highly concentrated. They also find that the higher the concentration of income
in a state, the more likely the state is to allow taxpayers to deduct federal income taxes from state
taxes.
The progressivity of a state’s tax system can substantially affect income inequality within a state. 
An individual state’s decision to adopt an income tax, for example, can have profound implications
on the distribution of income within a state as well as the social safety net available to poor
citizens. In recent research, we examined the ways in which the concentration of income within a
given state can affect state tax policy decisions (e.g. whether to adopt an income tax or whether
to permit the deduction of federal income taxes against state income taxes).  We find that there is
a positive relationship between income going to the top 1 percent and the likelihood a state will adopt an income
tax and permit deductions of federal taxes against state taxes.
Another key aspect of state tax policy that we examined is whether or not a state permits deducting federal
income taxes against state individual income taxes. States in which income taxpayers are permitted to deduct
their federal income taxes from their state individual income taxes raise less revenue than if federal income taxes
are not deducted.  Furthermore, since the federal income tax is progressive, permitting state income tax payers to
deduct federal income taxes against their state individual income tax liability will disproportionately benefit upper-
income individuals and will make a state’s individual income tax less progressive.
We examined the extent to which massive concentrations of wealth affect state tax policy by re-examining the
adoption of state individual income taxes between 1916 and1937, which was previously analyzed by Berry and
Berry (1992).  In replicating and updating this previous paper, we find that the concentration of wealth matters for
state tax policy, and that there is a positive relationship between income going to the top 1 percent and the
likelihood a state will adopt an income tax.  We find that states are more likely to adopt an income tax when there
are higher percentages of income flowing to the top 1 percent, suggesting that states have a desire to capture the
income of top earners when income becomes highly concentrated.   Most interesting however, is that an
interaction between Change in Per Capita Income and the percentage income going to the Top 1 percent
demonstrates support for the idea that the wealthy are able to resist efforts of taxation when the economy is
struggling.  This phenomenon is seen in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1 – Predicted Margins of Interaction Effect (Change in per capita income X Top 1 percent)
Figure 1 displays the probability a state will adopt an income tax (y-axis) for different values of the change in Per
Capita Income, plotted against the Top 1 percent variable on the x-axis.  The figure shows that the probability of a
state adopting an income tax is highest when the economy is struggling (e.g. low values of Per Capita Income). 
However, this likelihood of adopting an income tax decreases as income becomes more concentrated. 
Similarly, we examined deductibility of federal income taxes against state individual income taxes.  This is an
issue that significantly affects both the amount of money a state raises through its income tax and the distribution
of the tax burden.  Figure 2 shows that the percent of income for the top 1 percent in each state has quite a large
impact on whether deductibility is permitted.  This figure contains a solid line, which indicates the predicted values
of the percentage of income going to the top 1 percent with the dotted lines indicating confidence intervals for the
predicted values.  The tick marks along the x-axis show the distribution of the variable measuring the percentage
of income going to the richest 1 percent of taxpayers.  The figure shows a clear negative relationship between the
share of income for the wealthy and the likelihood a state will allow taxpayers to deduct federal income taxes from
their state taxes.
Figure 2-   Probability of Deductibility by Percent Income Going to Top 1 percent, 1960-2003
We also examine the interactive effect
between GDP and the concentration of
income within a state.  We find that states are
no more likely to permit deductions when the
economy is doing well.  However, the efforts
of states to continue to capture revenue (by
resisting efforts of allowing deductions)
become less likely as income becomes more
concentrated.  This phenomenon can be seen
in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3 – Predicted Margins of Interaction
Effect (GDP*Top 1 percent).           
In the context of the degree to which the percentage of income going to a wealthy population influences state tax
policy we tested whether or not a state should have an individual income tax, and if a state does have an
individual income tax, should it permit taxpayers to deduct federal income taxes against state individual income
taxes? Both of these questions materially affect both the size and distribution of a state’s tax burden as well as the
ability of states to combat the negative effects of wealth inequality.
The impact of the share of income going to the richest 1 percent of taxpayers provides interesting results.  In each
of the models tested, whether for the adoption of state income taxes or for the deductibility issue, the percentage
of income going to the top 1 percent was statistically and substantively significant.  Rather than demonstrating that
this flow of income to the wealthiest led to increased power among this group (at least in terms of resisting the
implementation of an income tax), states were more likely to adopt an income tax when the percentage of income
going to this group was large.
Similarly, the share of income going to the richest 1 percent of taxpayers was a significant predictor in every model
of the willingness of states to permit deducting federal income taxes against state individual income taxes.   The
relationship was always negative.  The greater the share of income going to the richest 1 percent of taxpayers, the
less likely a state was to permit deducting federal income taxes against state individual income taxes.  As with the
adoption of a state individual income tax, the results support a desire of states to retain revenue from wealthy
individuals.
The interactive effect between state growth and the concentration of income demonstrated important findings as
well.  Low growth states were more likely to adopt an income tax, yet this likelihood decreased as the percent
flowing to the Top 1 percent increased.  Similarly, states were more likely to permit deductions when economic
growth is sluggish, but the probability of adopting decreases as the percent income flowing to the Top 1 percent
increases. To the extent to which the wealthy oppose an income tax or desire deductions of federal taxes against
state income taxes, their power seems to wane somewhat during bad economic times.  That power, however,
seems to increase as the concentration of income increases.  Therefore, it seems that while states have a desire
to use the political opportunity of sluggish economic growth (which might fuel resentment against the wealthy), the
likelihood of either adopting an income tax or resisting efforts to permit deductions decreases under circumstances
in which income is highly concentrated.
Our results both support and extend the important work of Berry and Berry (1992), which find state tax policy
depends upon the political opportunity for state politicians to receive cover to implement a tax.  Our results
indicate that large shares of income going to the top 1 percent may contribute to that cover, as states seem to
want to capture some of the wealth flowing to the wealthiest.  While the wealthy may have disproportionate
influence on the political system, it seems that this influence is not absolute—states still need to take in revenue
and the wealthiest citizens are prime targets as income concentrations grow.
Our results show that the share of income received by the richest 1 percent of taxpayers does have an impact on
the likelihood states will adopt an income tax and permit deductions of federal taxes against state taxes.  As the
top 1 percent has seen most of the benefits of increasing inequality, our findings suggest that future studies should
continue to take into account the degree to which the wealthy have significant influence on policy as well as the
degree to which states are able to respond to this growing concentration of wealth.
Finally, as researchers continue to examine the causes and consequences of growing wealth inequality in the
United States, our findings suggest scholarship should examine the degree to which partisan differences in policy
matter not just at the national level, but also at the sub-national level.  Individual states are often the key
governmental actor for citizens in many areas of social welfare policy, as welfare is largely run through the states. 
Therefore, future research must focus on the ways in which state governments, and the tax policies they adopt,
respond to growing wealth inequality.
This article is based on the paper ‘State Adoption of Tax Policy: New Data and New Insights ’ in American Politics
Research, which is available ungated thanks to Sage until August 15th.
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